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Critical Discussion
THE DECLINE OF LITERARY CRITICISM
by Richard A. Posner
Rónán McDonald, a lecturer in literature at the University of Reading, has written a short, engaging book the theme of which 
is evident from the title: The Death of the Critic. Although there is plenty 
of both academic and journalistic writing about literature, less and less 
is well described by the term “literary criticism.” The literary critics of 
the first two-thirds or so of the twentieth century, now dead, including 
poets and other creative writers, such as T. S. Eliot, journalists such as 
Edmund Wilson, and academic literary critics, as distinct from literary 
scholars, such as F. R. Leavis in England and Cleanth Brooks in the 
United States, have so few successors that the very genre, if not yet dead, 
is moribund.1 McDonald deplores the decline of literary criticism and 
seeks to explain its causes.
In place of literary criticism, McDonald (and many others, such as 
John Ellis) argue, we have postmodern literary theory, an animal of 
quite a different color from literary criticism.2 “Texts . . . are interpreted 
and analysed with a view to unlocking the social norms and attitudes 
encoded therein, not assessed or evaluated as integral, self-contained 
creations” (McDonald, p. 21). “The ‘best’ [is regarded] as a politically 
dubious category, with selections made in its name often nurturing hid-
den and hierarchical agendas”(p. ix). “In a comparatively short time, 
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academic literary criticism has been transformed. Many [literary critics] 
now regard social activism as the major purpose of literary criticism.” 
And “people who write about literature now write in a prose thick with 
impenetrable jargon,” which erects a barrier between literary theory and 
literature.3 The well documented decline in the reading of literature 
has many causes but one may be the obscurantist and politicized style 
of teaching literature that is in vogue in many colleges.4
But something deeper is involved. After all, most literary teachers are 
not postmodernists. What has happened is the professionalization, in not 
altogether a good sense, of literary studies. Let me illustrate. More than 
half a century ago, Cleanth Brooks published what became a famous 
book of literary criticism, consisting of close readings of famous poems.5 
The New Critics were much taken with the metaphysical poets, the most 
prominent of whom was John Donne, and the high point of Brooks’s 
book was his brilliant close reading of “Canonization,” one of Donne’s 
most famous love poems. Just this year (2008) a professor of literature 
named Ramie Targoff published John Donne, Soul and Body, which has an 
extensive treatment of Donne’s love poetry, though it does not mention 
“Canonization.” As far as I can judge, Targoff’s book is a fine scholarly 
achievement—well written (and not defaced by jargon), thoroughly 
researched, thoughtful, imaginative. She argues that contrary to some 
scholars who have regarded Donne as a Neoplatonist who therefore 
believed that the highest love is purely spiritual (as it was for Plato), 
he was, throughout his career—even when he became a fiercely devout 
Anglican cleric writing fervid religious verse—a believer that body and 
soul were one in all activities, including sexual love; hence the religious 
imagery in “Canonization,” emphasized by Cleanth Brooks, who would 
I think have found Targoff’s analysis congenial. Her book is I would 
guess a model of modern literary scholarship.
But here is the difference between Brooks’s book, and specifically 
his discussion of Donne’s poem, and Targoff’s. Brooks, who though 
a distinguished Yale English professor did not have a Ph.D., wrote for 
a mixed audience—academics, students, the general reader—and he 
made the nonacademic members of that audience want to read Donne, 
or read more Donne, or re-read Donne with greater understanding and 
enjoyment. Targoff writes for other scholars of early modern English 
literature. Someone else who chances on the book (like me) may read it 
and think well of it, but unless one has esoteric religious or philosophi-
cal interests the experience of reading her book will not quicken one’s 
387Richard A. Posner
interest in reading Donne’s poetry—which is a great shame, given the 
state of the literary culture in America.
The professionalization of literary studies has many causes, but one 
of particular significance is a half century or more falling off in literary 
creativity. There are peaks in artistic creativity and troughs. For litera-
ture, the first quarter of the twentieth century was an incredible peak, 
and it engendered exciting literary criticism. In part this was because 
much of this modernist literature was difficult, and required expert 
interpretation. But that factor is overemphasized. Most modernist 
literature (Eliot, Yeats, late Henry James, Proust, Joyce until Finnegans 
Wake) is difficult only in comparison with Tennyson. Much literature 
that endures, whatever the era in which it was composed, is downright 
baffling—think of Shakespeare and his contemporaries (what did Mar-
vell mean by “Annihilating all that’s made / To a green Thought in a 
green Shade”?), or for that matter of Keats—what does “Beauty is truth, 
truth beauty” mean?
What happens in a period of heightened literary creativity is that 
not only are there exciting new works to subject to literary criticism 
but that, as T. S. Eliot famously said, the old works are seen in a new 
light—think of how Eliot’s own poetic practices shaped his criticism of 
Dante, Donne, the Elizabethan and Jacobean playwrights, and Milton. 
We are now rather in a trough of literary creativity, probably because of 
the rise of competing media for expression, and so there is less exciting 
work for literary critics. Not that there aren’t fine writers; but they are 
not literary revolutionaries—the analogy is to Thomas Kuhn’s notion of 
“normal science,” the dullish stretches between “paradigm shifts.”
But there is still a need for college and university teachers of English, 
and a felt need to evaluate them on the basis of their publications, 
and so the focus of their writing shifts from criticism to the more con-
ventional form of academic scholarship that involves writing for each 
other. The resulting decline in literary criticism retards the prospects 
for a renewal of literary creativity by reducing the audience for serious 
literature, so there is unfortunately something of a vicious cycle, though 
it seems doubtful that literary criticism has ever been much of a spur 
to literary creativity.
Now all that I have said so far is merely prologue; it is the (highly 
tentative) answer I would give to McDonald’s question about the causes 
of the decline of literary criticism. He not only gives a different answer, 
but has a different conception of literary criticism, and let me begin 
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my analysis of his book there. For him (not for me, as I’ll explain in 
due course) the essence of literary criticism is that it is evaluative; his 
book’s “governing theme is the fate of evaluation and the basis on 
which it is built” (p. ix). Because criticism is evaluative, it is disliked, as 
McDonald illustrates with some wonderful quotations. From Brendan 
Behan: “Critics are like eunuchs in a harem; they know how it is done, 
they’ve seen it done every day, but they’re unable to do it themselves” 
(p. 9). From George Bernard Shaw: “A drama critic is a man who leaves 
no turn unstoned” (p. 10). From Samuel Becket: literary criticism is 
“hysterectomies with a trowel” (p. 10). Northrop Frye derided evalua-
tive criticism as belonging to the history of taste rather than to literary 
criticism (pp. 100–101).
Of course, literary criticism is not all negative; “critic” is etymologi-
cally related to “criteria”; the literary critic is a judge, not a denouncer, 
and McDonald gives examples of literary criticism that have promoted 
a writer’s work, such as Edmund Wilson’s book Axel’s Castle. Neverthe-
less, literary critics’ “trade is evaluative hierarchies”—but, as we have just 
seen, “they are low on the totem pole of the writing profession” (p. 41), 
so when they do “criticize,” their work is derided by the writers.
The criticisms of criticism make it fragile, vulnerable, and so does 
the difficulty that critics have in keeping their criticism free from con-
tamination by their religious, political, and other extraliterary beliefs. 
The New Critics, nominally formalist, emphasized not only their opposi-
tion to science, technology, and industry,6 but also their belief that the 
outlook they found in the poetry and other literature they admired was 
isomorphic with Christianity.7 McDonald argues that postmodern literary 
theory descends from F. R. Leavis and other “extrinsic” critics (among 
whom the New Critics must, for the reason I just stated, be counted): 
“By focusing on the moral, life-affirming qualities of art, [Leavis] had 
created a culture whereby artistic values were instrumental, directed at 
purposes outside the artwork’s own merits” (p. 121). To the extent that 
literary critics’ evaluations of literary works are moral or ideological, 
they are unlikely to be objective. And, like the New Critics, Leavis and 
his followers saw the “moral, life-affirming qualities of art” as a bulwark 
against technological modernity, yet could not resist the pressure that 
academia exerts on academics to strive for intellectual rigor: “the implicit 
or explicit calls on scientific authority to justify literary critical practices, 
while at the same time holding culture as the redemptive alternative to 
science, would generate a tension that could easily teeter into outright 
contradiction. All that needed to happen was for the value-free methods 
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of literary criticism to double back and collide with its quasi-religious 
purposes” (p. 93).
Notice the dependence of McDonald’s analysis on his conception of 
literary criticism as evaluative. It is because it is evaluative (and because 
most of the evaluators are not themselves creative writers) that it is hated 
by creative writers and undermined by the critics’ inability to exclude 
their political or religious beliefs from their criticism at the same time 
that they are pretending to be rigorous and objective.
Suppose evaluation is not the essence of literary criticism. Suppose, 
further, that the quest for objective evaluation of literary works is a snipe 
hunt, so that it is fortunate that evaluation is not the essence of literary 
criticism. This reorientation would make the decline of criticism no less 
real, but would upend McDonald’s explanation of it.
Let me return to Cleanth Brooks’s analysis of Donne’s “Canonization.” 
It is obvious that he admires the poem. But he does not tell the reader, 
this is a good poem—read it; don’t read Joyce Kilmer or Vachel Lind-
say. He explains the poem, with particular emphasis on why it is shot 
through with paradox. He argues throughout The Well Wrought Urn that 
paradox is the language of poetry, and he supports the argument with 
reference not only to the “Canonization” but also to poems by Milton, 
Pope, Wordsworth, and others who were not part of the metaphysical 
school, the school of Donne. He leaves it to the reader to decide whether 
to read any of these poems. If one thinks of how the great twentieth-
century critics influenced taste—such as T. S. Eliot with respect to the 
metaphysical poets, Edmund Wilson with respect to the modernist poets, 
F. R. Leavis with resepct to D. H. Lawrence—one quickly realizes that it 
was not by ex cathedra utterance, such as “I am T. S. Eliot, the great poet 
and intellectual, and I tell you that Donne is superior to Milton,” but by 
saying, in effect, “You should try reading Donne, because he does things 
that when you understand him may cause you as it has caused me to 
prefer him to Milton, and he has a more mature, a more comprehensive 
conception of the human condition than Shelley (though less so than 
Dante did), as well as more exact metaphors.”
The approach of the influential academic critics, such as Brooks 
and Empson, C. S. Lewis and Lionel Trilling, A. C. Bradley and Rich-
ard Blackmun, was essentially the same. They were writing not only or 
even primarily for other academics, but rather for serious students and 
the cream of the general reading public, and they were trying to make 
literature more accessible and more interesting to readers.
Thus, what has been lost is literary criticism that helps people 
390 Philosophy and Literature
 understand and enjoy serious literature. The disappearance of arbiters 
of taste, of literary mandarins whose authority the laity is expected to 
acknowledge, is no loss. As Benedetto Croce said, “criticism conceived 
as magistrate kills the dead or breathes on the face of what is very much 
alive anyway . . . I would like to ask whether critics have been responsible 
for establishing the greatness of Dante, Shakespeare, or Michelangelo, or, 
on the contrary, the great number of their readers and spectators.”8
The problem with “criticism conceived as magistrate”—the problem 
that McDonald not only does not solve, but does not acknowledge—is 
that there are no objective criteria of aesthetic distinction. The reason is 
that there is nothing that all great works of literature have in common 
but lesser works of literature do not. When critics propose criteria that 
they think will distinguish the great from the non-great, they end up 
narrowing the canon of great literature in arbitrary ways, as T. S. Eliot 
attempted to do with Milton and Shelley. There is no need to develop 
a litmus test for great literature. Critics can point to the features of 
literary works that they like or dislike without assuming the authority 
to tell people what they should read. And Croce was right: you don’t 
need evaluative critics in order to have a “canon” of great literature. 
The canon evolves in Darwinian fashion; writers compete, and the works 
that are best adapted to the cultural environment flourish.
I fear that McDonald has succumbed to the cliché that the enemy of 
my enemy is my friend: the cultural studies crowd is against evaluative 
criticism, so McDonald is for it, provided it is objective—but he does 
not show how literary criticism can be objective. But the problem is 
not that modern-day literary criticism is not evaluative; it is that liter-
ary criticism aimed at increasing the readership of great literature has 
been displaced by literary theory, on the one hand, and by literary 
scholarship for literary scholars only (like Targoff’s book on Donne), 
on the other hand.
A recent issue of the New Yorker contains a terrific article on Milton by 
a journalist (who is also the author of a novel appropriately titled Eve’s 
Apple). The New Yorker has a large circulation and the article will persuade 
some of the magazine’s subscribers to read or re-read Milton’s poetry, 
but not because Jonathan Rosen is an “authority.” The great writers 
are little read in the United States, but this is not because they are not 
agreed to be great writers. College teachers influenced by modern-day 
literary theory to trash great literature and feed their captive audience a 
diet of obscurantist theoretical writings and deservedly obscure literary 
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works are doubtless a factor in the decline of the literary culture. But 
the dearth of evaluative criticism is not. If there were less pretentious 
literary theory and no evaluative criticism, but more readable literary 
criticism in the style of Cleanth Brooks or F. R. Leavis, the literary cul-
ture would be in a lot better shape than it is.
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